Brent Crude Falls Below $70 as Iran-US Ceasefire Reopens the Strait of Hormuz

The speed of the demand-side adjustment is itself a data point worth remembering the next time a Hormuz disruption scenario is discussed as an unmitigated catastrophe. Asian refiners and buyers demonstrated they could substitute alternative crude grades, redirect tanker routes, and draw down stockpiles fast enough to prevent the kind of sustained price spike many models assumed. That flexibility matters for how policymakers and forecasters should weight future geopolitical risk premia in oil markets.

Not all of the conflict's effects are reversing as cleanly. Damage to liquefied natural gas liquefaction infrastructure in Qatar — one of the world's largest LNG exporters — is expected to reduce projected supply growth for years, not months. The cumulative shortfall in LNG supply between 2026 and 2030 is estimated at around 120 billion cubic meters, a loss with implications for gas-importing economies in Europe and Asia that extends well past the point where oil prices normalized.

For energy importers, the practical takeaway is a split timeline: the acute oil-price shock has largely passed, and the EIA's own forecast points toward renewed oversupply and softer prices into 2027. But the LNG supply damage is a slower-moving, longer-duration cost of the conflict, and one that won't show up as cleanly in a daily Brent quote. Energy security planning that treats 'the crisis is over' as synonymous with 'all energy markets are back to normal' would be missing that distinction.